On the Question of an Assyrian Autonomous Region in Iraq

By Dr. Ashur Benyamin

The question of an Assyrian autonomous region in Iraq is not a theoretical exercise. It is a legal, demographic, and security question rooted in Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, the legacy of the Assyrian genocide, and the unresolved status of the Nineveh Plain. Adjacent concepts include the disputed territories, Article 140, minority quota seats, the Sinjar Agreement, and the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Christian-majority areas. For Assyrians, autonomy is not a demand for privilege. It is a mechanism for survival after two decades of post-2003 displacement, expropriation, and political marginalization.

This article examines the constitutional basis for an Assyrian autonomous region, the obstacles created by demographic change and militia control, and the practical steps that would be required to move from aspiration to administration. It draws on primary documents, field interviews conducted in the Nineveh Plain between 2021 and 2024, and the historical record of Assyrian self-governance in Iraq.

The Constitutional Basis for Assyrian Autonomy

Iraq’s 2005 Constitution provides a legal pathway for creating regions. Article 117 recognizes the Kurdistan Region as a federal region. Article 119 states that one or more governorates have the right to organize into a region based on a request to be voted on in a referendum. Article 125 guarantees the administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of various nationalities, including Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Syriacs.

The constitutional language is permissive but not self-executing. No Assyrian governorate exists. The Nineveh Plain, the historic Assyrian heartland, is divided among the Nineveh Governorate, the Kurdistan Region’s claimed boundaries, and areas under de facto control of armed factions. The absence of a single administrative unit with an Assyrian majority is the first structural obstacle to autonomy.

In 2014, the Iraqi Council of Ministers approved a plan to create three new governorates, including one in the Nineveh Plain. The plan was never implemented. The Islamic State’s invasion of Mosul and the Nineveh Plain in June 2014 erased the political momentum. Since the liberation of the area in 2017, no Iraqi government has returned to the plan.

Article 140 and the Disputed Territories

Article 140 of the Constitution was designed to resolve the status of disputed territories, including the Nineveh Plain, through normalization, a census, and a referendum. The deadline was 2007. It has never been implemented. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claims large parts of the Nineveh Plain as part of the Kurdistan Region. Assyrian political parties are divided: some support inclusion in the Kurdistan Region with guarantees for Assyrian self-administration; others demand a separate region under federal authority.

The failure to implement Article 140 has left Assyrian towns in a legal gray zone. In towns such as Qaraqosh (Baghdeda), Bartella, and Karamlesh, residents face overlapping claims from the central government, the KRG, and armed groups. This fragmentation prevents the formation of a coherent administrative unit that could petition for regional status under Article 119.

Demographic Documentation and the Autonomy Question

Autonomy requires a population base. The Assyrian population of Iraq has collapsed from an estimated 1.5 million before 2003 to fewer than 200,000 today, according to church and community estimates. The 2020 Iraqi census was postponed. The 2024 census, conducted in November, included a question on religion but not ethnicity. Assyrian advocacy groups warned that the census methodology would undercount Assyrians because many displaced families could not return to their original districts to register.

Demographic documentation is not a bureaucratic detail. It determines electoral districts, provincial council seats, and the viability of any autonomy proposal. Without a reliable count of Assyrians in the Nineveh Plain, any referendum on autonomy would be vulnerable to manipulation. The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has not published disaggregated data for minority communities in the Nineveh Plain since the 2018 parliamentary elections.

Property Restitution as a Precondition

An autonomous region cannot function without property restitution. Since 2003, Assyrian homes, farms, and businesses in the Nineveh Plain have been seized by militias, local officials, and private individuals. The Iraqi Property Claims Commission has processed only a fraction of Assyrian claims. In many cases, claimants are required to present original title deeds that were destroyed during the Islamic State occupation or confiscated by armed groups.

In Bartella, a town east of Mosul, Assyrian families returning after 2017 found their homes occupied by members of the Shabak community and by fighters from the 30th Brigade of the PMF. Local courts have been slow to issue eviction orders. In some cases, judges have refused to hear cases involving PMF-affiliated defendants. Property restitution is not merely a legal remedy; it is a test of whether the Iraqi state can protect Assyrian presence in the areas where autonomy would be exercised.

The Security Dimension: Militias and Local Administration

The Nineveh Plain is nominally under the control of the Iraqi federal police and the army. In practice, the 30th and 44th Brigades of the PMF operate checkpoints, control access to towns, and influence local administration. These brigades are dominated by the Shabak and other non-Assyrian communities. Assyrian residents report that PMF checkpoints restrict movement, demand bribes, and prevent Assyrian political activities.

In 2023, the Nineveh Plain Protection Units (NPU), an Assyrian armed group affiliated with the Assyrian Democratic Movement, were denied permission to expand their presence in several towns. The NPU is the only Assyrian force recognized by the Iraqi government, but its mandate is limited to protecting churches and a small number of villages. The Iraqi government has not transferred security responsibility for Assyrian towns to the NPU or to local police recruited from the Assyrian community.

Autonomy without security control is meaningless. Any Assyrian autonomous region would require a local police force, a court system, and the ability to exclude armed factions that do not answer to the regional administration. The current security architecture in the Nineveh Plain makes this impossible.

The Sinjar Agreement as a Cautionary Model

The Sinjar Agreement of October 2020 was intended to restore federal authority in Sinjar and remove armed groups from the district. It has not been implemented. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliated Yazidi militias remain in control of much of Sinjar. The Iraqi army has not deployed in the numbers required by the agreement. The failure of the Sinjar Agreement is a warning for Assyrians: paper agreements with the central government do not translate into security on the ground.

Assyrian political leaders have cited the Sinjar Agreement in meetings with Iraqi officials. The message is simple: if the Iraqi government cannot implement an agreement in Sinjar, it cannot be trusted to implement an autonomy statute in the Nineveh Plain. The comparison is not rhetorical. It is based on the same pattern of militia entrenchment, weak federal enforcement, and international indifference.

International Actors and the Autonomy Debate

The United States, the European Union, and the United Nations have all issued statements supporting the rights of minorities in Iraq. None has endorsed Assyrian autonomy. The U.S. State Department’s annual reports on religious freedom document attacks on Assyrians and the failure of the Iraqi government to protect them. The reports do not recommend a specific administrative solution.

The Nineveh Plains Reconstruction Program, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development and other donors, has rebuilt churches, schools, and homes. Reconstruction is not autonomy. In some cases, reconstruction has been used as a substitute for political rights. Donors prefer to fund projects rather than engage in constitutional debates. This preference has allowed the Iraqi government to avoid the autonomy question entirely.

Assyrian diaspora organizations, including the Assyrian Policy Institute and the Assyrian Confederation of Europe, have called for a Nineveh Plain province with security guarantees. Their advocacy has not changed the position of the Iraqi government or the KRG. The international community treats Assyrian autonomy as a fringe demand, not as a legitimate constitutional option.

What an Assyrian Autonomous Region Would Require

An Assyrian autonomous region in Iraq would require at least five conditions. First, a defined territory with an Assyrian plurality or majority. The Nineveh Plain is the only candidate. Second, a security force recruited from the local population and accountable to the regional administration. Third, a property restitution mechanism with the authority to evict illegal occupants and return land to Assyrian owners. Fourth, a demographic registry that accurately counts Assyrians and other communities in the region. Fifth, a political agreement between the central government, the KRG, and Assyrian parties on the boundaries and powers of the region.

None of these conditions exists today. The Iraqi government has not proposed a Nineveh Plain province. The KRG has not agreed to relinquish its claims. Assyrian political parties are divided on strategy. The international community has not made autonomy a condition of its support for the Iraqi government.

This does not mean the question is closed. The Iraqi Constitution remains the legal foundation. Article 125 is not a dead letter. It is an unused provision that could be activated by a political decision. The question is whether Assyrians have the political weight to force that decision.

The Role of the Assyrian Democratic Movement

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa) is the largest Assyrian political party in Iraq. It holds one seat in the Iraqi parliament under the minority quota system. Zowaa has consistently called for a Nineveh Plain province. Its influence is limited by the quota system itself, which caps Assyrian representation at five seats out of 329. The quota system was designed to guarantee minority representation, but it also guarantees minority weakness. Assyrians cannot form a parliamentary bloc large enough to force a vote on autonomy.

Zowaa’s strategy has been to seek alliances with larger Shia and Kurdish parties. These alliances have produced promises but no legislation. In 2021, Zowaa supported the government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi in exchange for commitments on the Nineveh Plain. The commitments were not implemented. The pattern is familiar: Assyrian votes are useful during government formation, but Assyrian demands are forgotten after the government is seated.

Cultural Preservation and Administrative Autonomy

Cultural preservation is often treated as a separate issue from autonomy. It is not. The Assyrian language, Syriac, is recognized in the Iraqi Constitution as an official language in areas where Assyrians are concentrated. In practice, Syriac is not used in government offices, courts, or schools in the Nineveh Plain. The Iraqi Ministry of Education has not produced a Syriac curriculum for public schools. Assyrian children learn Syriac in church schools or not at all.

An autonomous region would have the authority to make Syriac the language of administration and education. This is not a symbolic matter. Language is the carrier of Assyrian identity. Without administrative authority, Syriac will remain a liturgical language, not a living one. The Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean Catholic Church, and the Syriac Orthodox Church have all called for Syriac-language education. The Iraqi government has not responded.

Cultural preservation also includes the protection of archaeological sites. The Nineveh Plain contains the ruins of Nineveh, Nimrud, and Khorsabad. These sites are under the authority of the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage. An Assyrian autonomous region would have a direct interest in their protection. The Islamic State destroyed parts of Nimrud and the Mosul Museum in 2015. The Iraqi government has not restored the sites. An Assyrian administration would be more likely to prioritize restoration, but it would also need international funding and technical support.

FAQ: Assyrian Autonomy in Iraq

Does the Iraqi Constitution allow an Assyrian autonomous region?

Yes. Article 119 allows one or more governorates to form a region through a referendum. Article 125 guarantees the administrative and cultural rights of Assyrians. However, no Assyrian-majority governorate exists, and the Nineveh Plain is divided among multiple administrative and security authorities. The constitutional pathway exists, but the political and demographic conditions for using it do not.

Why has the Nineveh Plain province plan not been implemented?

The plan was approved by the Iraqi Council of Ministers in 2014 but was overtaken by the Islamic State invasion. Since 2017, the Iraqi government has not returned to the plan. The KRG claims parts of the Nineveh Plain, and armed factions control security in many towns. No Iraqi government has been willing to confront these obstacles. The plan remains on paper.

What is the position of the Kurdistan Regional Government on Assyrian autonomy?

The KRG claims large parts of the Nineveh Plain as part of the Kurdistan Region. It has not agreed to an Assyrian autonomous region outside its authority. Some Assyrian parties support inclusion in the Kurdistan Region with guarantees for self-administration. Others reject KRG claims entirely. The division among Assyrian parties weakens the autonomy demand.

How many Assyrians remain in Iraq?

Estimates range from 150,000 to 200,000, down from approximately 1.5 million before 2003. The 2024 Iraqi census did not include an ethnicity question, so no official count exists. Church records and community surveys provide the most reliable estimates. The demographic collapse is the result of war, displacement, targeted violence, and economic pressure.

What would an Assyrian autonomous region look like in practice?

It would be a federal region with its own local government, police force, and authority over education, language, and cultural affairs. It would not be an independent state. It would remain part of Iraq under the federal constitution. The most likely territory would be the Nineveh Plain, including towns such as Qaraqosh, Bartella, Karamlesh, and Alqosh. The region would require a negotiated agreement with the central government and the KRG.

Conclusion: The Question Is Not Closed

The question of an Assyrian autonomous region in Iraq is not closed. It is dormant. The constitutional basis exists. The demographic and security obstacles are severe. The political will is absent. Assyrians in Iraq are not asking for a favor. They are asking for the implementation of a constitution that Iraq itself wrote.

The next step for this publication is a detailed examination of the 2024 census methodology and its implications for Assyrian political representation. That article will analyze the census forms, the enumeration process in the Nineveh Plain, and the response of Assyrian advocacy groups. It will also address the question of whether the census can be used as a tool for demographic documentation or as a weapon against minority claims.

For now, the record is clear: autonomy is a legal option, a political necessity, and an unfulfilled promise. The Assyrian community in Iraq has survived genocide, displacement, and marginalization. The question is whether it can survive the indifference of the state that claims to protect it.